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ABSTRACT
This article critically examines the judicial applications of the EU functionality
doctrine and argues that recent CJEU decisions are at odds with the EU legislator’s
declared intention to give functionality a much greater role in promoting product
market competition. As a statutory ground for refusing registration even in the
presence of consumer association and established goodwill, EU functionality serves to
avoid undue competitive advantages by refusing protection in support of freedom to
compete. EU functionality represents a significant obstacle to registration for purely
natural, technical and value adding signs representing the shape of the goods. As of
2015, the wording now includes not only the shape but also another product
“characteristic” such as colour, sounds, scents, texture, etc. Thus, these tripartite
criteria underpinning EU functionality are likely to affect the registration of
unconventional marks or product trade dress brands. This article undertakes a
deeper examination into each of these non-functionality criteria, highlighting
problematic interpretations and suggesting ways to improve existing practice.
Unlike existing narratives, this article places the competition goals of EU trade mark
law at the centre of the debate and within a much broader context beyond functional
signs exclusions, which also includes the general eligibility conditions and nondistinctiveness requirements.
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LOUBOUTIN HEELS AND THE COMPETITION GOALS OF EU TRADE MARK
LAW
CESAR J. RAMIREZ-MONTES*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article begins with a tricky question. What does the recent high-profile
litigation involving the red sole of Louboutin shoes1 have in common with other
disputes involving the shape of the Philips three-headed rotary shaver,2 the Lego toy
brick,3 the Bang & Olufsen pencil-shaped loudspeaker,4 the G-star Elwood jeans,5 the
Yoshidine knife,6 the Rubik’s cube,7 the Kit-Kat four-fingered chocolate biscuit,8 the
Tripp-Trapp children’s chair,9 the London taxi cab,10 the Lego manikins,11 and the
gold and pink bottles of Bottega Gold’s sparkling wines?12 They all involved
registered trade marks, the validity of which was challenged on the basis that they
were utilitarian designs. Where the validity claims succeeded, the registration rights
immediately ended notwithstanding strong public association and significant
reputation owing to their proprietors’ long-standing investments. In those successful
instances, the effect was to permit defendant companies to freely market identical or
very similar products that were in direct competition with the brand owner, which
may arguably cause confusion. What may seem even more striking is that protecting
brand owners against unfair competition and preventing consumer confusion
crucially underpin EU trade mark law.13 What then was the ground upon which
some of these famous registrations were lost? That ground was the EU trade mark
functionality criteria under ex-Art.3(1)(e) (now Art.4(1)(e) recast) Trade Marks
Directive (TMD)14 and Art.7(1)(e) Community Trade Marks Regulation (as amended
*© Cesar J. Ramirez-Montes 2019.
Intellectual Property Lecturer, Leeds University. Many
thanks to all participants at the WIPs Lunch hosted by University College London in February
2019.
1 Case C-163/16, Christian Louboutin v. Van Haren Shoenen BV, 2018 E.C.R. I-423.
2 Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd,
2002 E.C.R. I-377.
3 Case C-48/09, Lego Juris A/S v. Mega Brands, 2010 E.C.R. I-516.
4 Case T-508/08, Bang & Olufsen A/S v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. II-06975.
5 Case C-371/06, Benetton Group SpA v. G-Star Int BV, 2007 E.C.R. I-542.
6 Case C-421/15, Yoshida Metal Industry Co v. EUIPO, 2017 E.C.R. I-360; Cases C-337/12 to C340/12, Pi-Design AG v. Yoshida Metal Industry Co, 2014 E.C.R. I-129.
7 Case C-30/15, Simba Toys v. Seven Towns, 2016 E.C.R. I-849.
8 Case C-215/14, Société des Produits Nestlé SA v. Cadbury UK, 2015 E.C.R. I-604.
9 Case C-205/13, Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233.
10 The London Taxi Co v. Frazer-Nash Research Ltd [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1729 (Eng.).
11 Case C-452/15, Best-Lock (Europe) v. Lego Juris A/S, 2016 E.C.R. I-270.
12 Case T-324/18 and Case T-325/18, Vinicola Tombacco (VI.TO.) Srl v. EUIPO, 2019 E.C.R. II297, 2019 E.C.R. II-299.
13 Cesar Ramirez-Montes, A Re-Examination of the Original Foundations of Anglo-American
Trademark Law, 14 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 91 (2010).
14 Directive 2015/2436, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 to
Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks (Recast), 2015 O.J. (L 336)
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by European Trade Mark Regulation 2015/2424 or ETMR15). Functionality assumes
that certain shapes or product features are so important for the absolute freedom of
all traders to compete that they must remain in the public domain and
unencumbered by exclusive rights. When that is the case, functionality represents
an insurmountable obstacle to registration as functional marks are prevented by law
ever fulfilling the general requirement of indicating a commercial source to
consumers or, if registration exists, acts as a ground for invalidating the registration
even if proving that extensive market use has resulted in the functional mark
successfully acquiring source significance. EU functionality serves to avoid undue
competitive advantages by refusing protection in support of freedom to compete. The
greater public interest in enhancing product competition overrides the public interest
in preserving reputation and avoiding consumer confusion. Examining functionality
matters, and European scholars are increasingly paying close attention to the
doctrine.16 The limits of the functionality doctrine are therefore of great interest to
brand owners across markets but its normative content and appropriate scope has
much wider implications for society and the public, and this article examines each
functionality criterion in order to challenge problematic interpretations and
assumptions with a view to making a contribution to the field but going beyond
ongoing debates in calling for a change in the way EU functionality is developing.
This article argues that the European functionality doctrine is currently at a
crossroads, and some would point out that recent decisions have left it in “an
unfortunate conundrum.”17 On the one hand, the 2015 legislative reforms have
resulted in the expansion of the statutory criteria for permanently refusing (or
invalidating) the registration of product trade dress brands on functionality grounds.
According to Art.4(1)(e) TMD and Art.7(1)(e) EUTMR, functional signs are excluded
if they consist exclusively of the shape or “another characteristic” which results from
the nature of the goods (natural signs), are necessary to achieve a technical result
(technical signs), or give substantial value to the goods (ornamental signs). These
non-functional registration requirements operate independently of each other and
together form the EU “functionality” doctrine. Prior to 2015, (ex-)Art.3(1)(e)TMD18
and Art.7(1)(e) CTMR19 referred solely to functionality in terms of “the shape of
1, 7. The (recast) Directive entered into force on January 12, 2016, and Member States had three
years (deadline of January 14th, 2019) to transpose it into national law.
15 Regulation 2015/2424, 2015 O.J. (L 341) 21, 28 (EU). The new EUTMR came into force on 23rd
March 2016 but certain provisions which require implementing legislation will enter into force on
October 1st, 2017. See also, Regulation 2017/1001, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
14 June 2017 on the European Union Trade Mark, 2017 O.J. (L 154) 1, 8 (EU).
16 Maeve Lynch, Product Configuration Marks: The Shape of Things to Come, 12 J. INTELL.
PROP. LAW & PRAC. 465, 465 (2017); Apostolos Chronopoulos, De Jure Functionality of Shapes
Driven by Technical Considerations in Manufacturing Methods 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 286, 286 (2017);
Gabriele Engels & Claire Lehr, Sweets, Cars and Bottles - Three Dimensional Trade Marks?, 12 J.
INTELL. PROP. LAW & PRAC. 797 (2017); Antoon Quaedvlieg, Shapes with a Technical Function: An
Ever-Expanding Exclusion?, 1 ERA FORUM 101, 101 (2016).
17 Lavinia Brancusi, Trade Marks’ Functionality in EU Law: Expected New Trends After the
Louboutin Case, 2 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 98, 105 (2019).
18 Directive 2008/95/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to
Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 2008 O.J. (L 299) 25, 26.
19 Council Regulation 207/2009 of 26 February 2009, on the Community Trade Mark, 2009 O.J.
(L 78) 1, 3 (EU).
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goods.” Non-shape functionality cases were not included. Given the enlargement of
the universe of registrable marks under the 2015 reforms, the EU legislature
considered it appropriate to enable functionality to have a much greater role in the
exclusion of product features that, whilst being source-identifiers in the eyes of
consumers, may nevertheless cause serious distortions of competition. On the other
hand, recent Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) decisions interpreting (ex-)Art.3(1)(e)
TMD appear to run counter to the clear legislative intent to expand rather than
restrict the scope of functionality. Whilst the CJEU appears to take a teleological
approach (looking beyond the literal wording) to the normative content of the
undefined functionality criteria, it takes a more formalistic (restricted to the literal
wording) viewpoint of the category of marks that may be subject to a functionality
examination. The recent Louboutin opinion illustrates this formalistic view insofar
as the Court concluded that Louboutin’s red colour mark for the outer sole of highheeled shoes cannot constitute exclusively a “shape” within the meaning of (ex)Art.3(1)(e).20 Since non-shape mark cases cannot formally fall within this provision,
the CJEU’s narrow interpretation automatically excludes a competition enquiry into
the ability of rivals to meet consumer demand for equally competing products in the
women’s shoes market on the potential ground that the Louboutin mark adds
substantial value to the goods (or is aesthetically functional in US law).
More recently, the CJEU affirmed its restrictive Louboutin interpretation of
“shape” by excluding the revocation of a registered decorative pattern mark on
functionality grounds notwithstanding the existence of copyright protection for the
pattern as an artistic copyright work.21 These are not however isolated instances of a
formalistic approach to the statutory functionality criteria. In Apple, the Court
excluded a functionality analysis of a 3D representation of a store design for retail
service mark because (ex-)Art.3(1)(e) explicitly refers to the shape of goods, not
services.22 Despite the wider implications of allowing registration of store designs as
trade marks, the effect of Apple is to leave the examination of any competition
concerns within distinctiveness assessments even though this a flexible barrier that
evidence of consumer acceptance (or secondary meaning) may easily overcome.23 The
formalistic view that the statutory wording concerns only the shape of “goods” (not
the shape of “services”) seems counter-intuitive and unconvincing, particularly in the
light of the Court’s own case-law according to which European law “must not be
interpreted solely on the basis of its wording but also in the light of the overall
scheme and objectives of the system of which it is a part.”24 In other rulings, the
CJEU has consistently stated that the overwhelming aim of the functionality
exclusions concerns the problem of anti-competitive protection rather than
cumulation of rights per se.25 However, if the overriding aim of European
functionality is to avoid distortions of competition arising from permanent trade
mark exclusivity, it is hard to see why the exclusion of aesthetically ornamental
Case C-163/16, Christian Louboutin v. Van Haren Shoenen BV, 2018 E.C.R. I-423.
Case C-21/18, Textilis Ltd v. Sveskt Tenn AB, 2019 E.C.R. I-199.
22 Case C-421/13, Apple Inc. v. Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt, 2014 E.C.R. I-2070 (¶ 24).
23 Cesar J. Ramirez-Montes, Trade Marking the Look and Feel of Business Environments in
Europe, 25 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 75 (2019).
24 Case C-292/00, Davidoff & Cie SA v. Godkit Ltd, 2003 E.C.R. I-9 (¶ 24); Case C-408/81,
Adidas-Salomon AG v Fitnessworld Trading Ltd, 2003 E.C.R. I-582 (¶¶ 19-20).
25 See infra II.A. (“The Ration Legis of the European Functionality Criteria”).
20
21
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shapes has no application to a decorative pattern mark or a trade dress mark for
retail services. Moreover, commentators seem to exacerbate this bewildering state of
affairs in their criticisms that the CJEU’s decisions have starkly expanded the ambit
of functionality to address competitors’ interests at the expense of reduced
transparency and legal certainty.26 In fact, given the unprecedented expansions of
the definition of a trade mark, it is puzzling to see only the partial expansion of
grounds for refusing registration or the creation of defenses to permit relevant uses
in the interest of competition or other expressive uses.27 Functionality therefore
deserves closer attention and this article critically examines its judicial applications
in the case-law, highlighting shortcomings and suggesting ways to improve current
practice.
This article re-examines the (unsettled) boundaries of the European
functionality by reviewing the relevant case-law and the literature, but it goes
beyond existing narratives in placing the competition goals of EU trade mark law
within a broader context which includes both distinctiveness evaluations and
functionality. Commentary usually focusses on the functionality provision without
considering the law’s wider function of promoting market competition that is
inherent in the other grounds for refusing registration.28 Furthermore, this paper is
ambitious in promoting a more rigorous academic debate around the growing
importance of competition-based considerations in EU trade mark law and in offering
arguments for adopting a more consistent policy that enhances, rather than limits
the reach of functionality. Accordingly, Part I identifies unrestrained product
competition as the leitmotif in EU trade mark functionality and then goes on to
discuss tactical behavior in the classification of marks that may be subject to a
functionality examination as a way to escape a functionality attack. This is then
contrasted with the over-inclusive approach to categories of marks that fall within
the strict analytical criterion for predicting consumer reaction to shapes or any other
unconventional mark as source-identifiers (also known as ‘distinctiveness
evaluation’). Part II then turns to each of the functionality criteria, highlighting
shortcomings in the case-law and making the case for a much broader view of
technical functionality. It also challenges some suggestions in the literature,
particularly regarding the problematic criterion excluding functional features that
add substantial value to the goods. Part III finally challenges recent suggestions
about the way the value-adding criterion should be interpreted and draws upon US
scholarship to argue for a more nuanced approach to this criterion.

26 ANNETTE KUR & MARTIN SEFTLEBEN, EUROPEAN TRADE MARK LAW, A COMMENTARY 152
(2017). Cf Uma Suthersanen, Excluding Designs (and Shape Marks): Where Is the EU Court of
Justice Going?, 50 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 157, 159 (2019) (“the CJEU is not
merely aligning the interpretations of the functionality clauses, but may be embarking on a far more
ambitious policy programme in relation to all three-dimensional objects.”).
27 Irene Calboli, Chocolate, Fashion, Toys and Cabs: The Misunderstood Distinctiveness of NonTraditional Trade Marks, 1 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION LAW 1-2 (2018).
28 Maeve Lynch, Product Configuration Marks: The Shape of Things to Come, 12 J. INTELL.
PROP. LAW & PRAC. 465, 465 (2017); Apostolos Chronopoulos, De Jure Functionality of Shapes
Driven by Technical Considerations in Manufacturing Methods 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 286, 286 (2017);
Gabriele Engels & Claire Lehr, Sweets, Cars and Bottles - Three Dimensional Trade Marks?, 12 J.
INTELL. PROP. LAW & PRAC. 797 (2017); Antoon Quaedvlieg, Shapes with a Technical Function: An
Ever-Expanding Exclusion?, 1 ERA FORUM 101, 101 (2016).
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II. PART I
A. The Ration Legis of the European Functionality Criteria
Functional features offer utilitarian advantages that consumers are likely to
seek in the products of competitors. European law thus assumes that reserving such
features to one single trader may confer abnormal advantages and reduce rather
than enhance competition in the market. In Lego, the CJEU identified the procompetition considerations that the EU legislature sought to balance in the wording
of the functionality provision. Firstly, in explaining the rules laid down by the
legislature, the Court affirmed the two-fold rationale underpinning the public
interest behind European functionality, namely the “anti-monopoly” criterion and the
“demarcation” criterion. Under the anti-monopoly criterion, functionality seeks “to
prevent trade mark law granting an undertaking a monopoly on technical solutions
or functional characteristics of product,” particularly where those solutions have been
previously protected by another IP right.29 This anti-monopoly criterion runs
through all the three forms of functionality in ex-Art.3(1)(e).30 Furthermore, under
the “demarcation” criterion, functionality seeks to keep separate the subject-matter
of trade mark protection from that afforded by other time-limited IP rights. The
concern behind this demarcation criterion is to avoid limiting the freedom of
competitors supplying products incorporating a technical solution or reducing
permanently their choices. However, the central aim of this criterion is not to
prevent cumulation of rights per se. EU law in fact allows for the possibility of
several forms of IP protection over the same object.31 Rather, the additional aim of
EU functionality doctrine is much broader.32 Its purpose is “overwhelmingly to
protect competition,”33 and this overriding aim percolates through all the subcategories of functionality, i.e. natural, technical and aesthetic shapes. Its rationale
is far removed from the essential source-indicating function of the trade mark.
The CJEU sees the freedom of traders to compete in absolute terms and the
rationale of the statutory provision “is tied to the problem of anti-competitive
protection in relation to ‘technical solutions’ and ‘functional characteristics’ of a
product.”34 On the other hand, the CJEU in Lego held that the terms “exclusively”
and “necessary” serve to restrict the scope of functionality as the legislature
acknowledged that “any shape of goods is, to a certain extent, functional and that it
would therefore be inappropriate to refuse to register a shape of goods as trade mark

Case C-48/09, Lego Juris A/S v. Mega Brands, 2010 E.C.R. I-516 (¶¶ 43, 45).
Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd,
2002 E.C.R. I-377 (¶ 78) (‘The rationale of the grounds for refusal of registration laid down in
Art.3(1)(e)…’).
31 Council Regulation 6/2002 of Dec. 12, 2001, On Community Designs, 2001 O.J. (L 003) 4 (EC).
32 Uma Suthersanen, The European Court of Justice in Philips v Remington – Trade Marks and
Market Freedom, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 257, 275 (2003).
33 Lego Juris A/S v. Mega Brands, 2010 E.C.R. I-516 (Opinion of AG Mengozzi, at ¶ 74).
34 Uma Suthersanen, The European Court of Justice in Philips v Remington – Trade Marks and
Market Freedom, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 257, 268 (2003).
29
30
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solely on the ground that it has functional characteristics.”35 Therefore, the limiting
effect of these terms is that functionality solely covers product shapes which only
incorporate a technical solution; the presence of one or more minor arbitrary element
cannot alter the conclusion that they are purely functional. Conversely, utilitarian
functionality cannot apply if a product shape incorporates “a major non-functional
element, such as a decorative or imaginative element which plays an important role
in the shape.”36 Taken together, therefore, the wording “necessary” and “exclusively”
strike a balance between permanent exclusion of purely functional signs and
potential protection of arbitrary signs merely having some functionality.
B. Does Classification of Marks Really Matter?
Recent high-profile cases such as the Louboutin red-soled shoes litigation and
other ongoing disputes demonstrate that classification does really matter.37 There
are significant legal consequences in determining the type of mark concerned.
Indeed, under EU trade mark law, the distinction between different types of marks
has a significant influence not only on their subject-matter of protection but also on
the type of assessments and the policy considerations underpinning the applicable
grounds.38 Given that by express desire of the EU legislature functional shapes (or
another characteristic, as of 2016) can never be protected even after acquiring source
significance or secondary meaning, avoiding functionality’s mortal blow constitutes
tactical behavior.39 This paper argues that this has created two illogical approaches.
While the CJEU adopts an over-inclusive approach to its modified analytical
framework for distinctiveness evaluations, it takes a far more under-inclusive
(formalistic) approach to functionality. For instance, the undefined concept of
“shape” is usually understood as “a set of lines or contours that outline the product
concerned,” and cannot extend to a position mark comprising the application of a
colour per se to a specific part of a product as in Louboutin’s red outsole mark.40 Nor
can “shape” cover a pattern mark comprising decorative motifs and words, which is

35 Lego Juris A/S v. Mega Brands, 2010 E.C.R. I-516 (¶ 48). See also, Case C-421/15, Yoshida
Metal Industry Co v. EUIPO, 2017 E.C.R. I-360 (¶ 26).
36 Lego Juris A/S v. Mega Brands, 2010 E.C.R. I-516 (¶ 52). See also, Case C-421/15, Yoshida
Metal Industry Co v. EUIPO, 2017 E.C.R. I-360 (¶ 27).
37 Case C-21/18, Textilis Ltd v. Sveskt Tenn AB, 2019 E.C.R. I-199; Case C-578/17, Oy Hartwall
Ab v. Patentti-ja rekisterihallitus, 2019 E.C.R. I-261; Case C-163/16, Christian Louboutin v. Van
Haren Shoenen BV, 2018 E.C.R. I-423; Case C-26/17, Birkenstock Sales GmbH v. EUIPO, 2018
E.C.R. 714; Case T-447/16, Pirelli Tyre SpA v. EUIPI, 2018 E.C.R. II-709, appeal pending (Case C818/18 and Case C-6/19); Case T-68/16, Deichmann SE v. EUIPO, 2018 E.C.R. II-7, appeal pending
(Case C-223/18 P).
38 Case C-578/17, Oy Hartwall Ab v. Patentti-ja rekisterihallitus, 2019 E.C.R. I-261 (¶ 35). See
also, Dev Gangjee, Paying the Price for Admission: Non-Traditional Marks Across Registration and
Enforcement, in THE PROTECTION OF NON-TRADITIONAL MARKS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 59, 63
(Irene Calboli & Martin Senftleben eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2018).
39 Dev Gangjee, Paying the Price for Admission: Non-Traditional Marks Across Registration and
Enforcement, in THE PROTECTION OF NON-TRADITIONAL MARKS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 59, 63
(Irene Calboli & Martin Senftleben eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2018) (outlining the scope for
applicants’ tactical behaviour at the characterisation stage.).
40 Case C-163/16, Christian Louboutin v. Van Haren Shoenen BV, 2018 E.C.R. I-423 (¶ 21).
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affixed to fabric or paper.41 This formalistic view of ‘shape’ contrasts with the more
permissive approach to regarding a stitching pattern in the design of trousers as an
aesthetically functional “shape.”42 More importantly, this formalistic view bypasses
the articulated policy concerns underpinning EU functionality. In Textilis, the CJEU
held that the existence of time-limited copyright protection for the MANHATTAN
pattern mark was irrelevant for the purpose of characterizing the mark as consisting
‘exclusively of the shape,”43 without even discussing functionality’s broader policy of
preventing the use of trade mark law to extend indefinitely other time-limited IP
rights. Nor did the Court’s formalistic reasoning in Louboutin consider the risk of
permanent market foreclosure by excessively restricting competitors’ freedom in a
market where economic development is based on a cyclical use of earlier aesthetic
innovations and materials within a limited number of appealing colours.
Neither Louboutin nor Textilis is easy to reconcile with Dyson. In Dyson,
functionality provided “a broader interpretative framework”44 to prevent registration
of the novel concept of a bagless hoover that would result in undue monopolies within
the eligibility requirement of “a sign.” Dyson attempted to register a mark that
consisted of “a transparent bin or collection chamber forming part of the external
surface of a vacuum cleaner as shown in the representation.”45 Along with this
description, it submitted images of two bagless vacuum cleaners with external bins
as mere examples and specifically stated that the mark was not for a shape but for a
non-specific transparent bin.46 This strategy meant that the (then) functionality
objections could not apply. This however did not prevent the CJEU taking a broader
view to hold that the application did not satisfy the definitional requirement that a
mark must be “sign” under (ex-)Art.2 TMD (now Art.3 recast Directive) in the sense
of being a particular type of subject-matter. Instead, the application was “capable of
taking on a multitude of different appearances and [was] thus not specific.”47 The
Dyson mark was also insufficiently defined, lacking clarity and precision
underpinning the (then) requirement of graphic representation.48 The Dyson
application however was more than a simple specificity problem. The Court
interpreted other eligibility requirements in accordance with the logic and policy
concerns underpinning functionality when it stated that the purpose of a “sign”
requirement is “to prevent the abuse of trade mark law in order to obtain an unfair
competitive advantage.”49 Thus, “it [was] the prevention of undue monopolies which
the court [saw] as the key problem with the application.”50 The CJEU expressed
concern that the exclusivity inherent in trade mark rights would entitle Dyson “to
prevent its competitors from marketing vacuum cleaners having any kind of
Case C-21/18, Textilis Ltd v. Sveskt Tenn AB, 2019 E.C.R. I-199 (¶ 36).
Case C-371/06, Benetton Group SpA v. G-Star Int BV, 2007 E.C.R. I-542 (the shape marks
consisted of an oval kneepad and two lines of sloping stitching from hip height to crotch height.).
43 Textilis Ltd v. Sveskt Tenn AB, 2019 E.C.R. I-199 (¶ 45).
44 Vlotina Liakatou & Sypros Maniatis, Lego – Building a European Concept of Functionality,
12 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 653, 653 (2010).
45 Case C-321/03, Dyson v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2007 E.C.R. I-51 (¶ 10).
46 Id. (¶ 19).
47 Id. (¶ 37).
48 Id. (Opinion of AG Léger, at ¶¶ 62-63).
49 Id. (¶ 34.)
50 Edward Smith, Dyson and the Public Interest: An Analysis of the Dyson Trade Mark Case,
11 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 469, 472 (2007).
41
42
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transparent collecting bin on their external surface, irrespective of its shape.”51 It
thus internalized competition concerns within general eligibility criteria using
functionality’s broader aims. Indeed, AG Léger purposively argued that the general
competition interest underpinning (ex)Art.3(1)(e) militated against registration of a
technical feature notwithstanding the provision’s reference to “exclusively of the
shape.”52
By contrast, a wide range of unconventional marks such as colours, colour
combinations, packaging, position marks, surface patterns, surface decoration, and
sounds are treated as “shapes” for the purpose of the rigorous “departs significantly”
test to gauge potential consumer predisposition to source.53 Under this modified
distinctiveness test, average consumers are normally assumed not to be in the habit
of making assumptions about the origin of goods on the basis of “their shape or the
shape of their packaging”54 in the absence of any graphic or word element. Thus,
“the more closely the shape for which registration as a mark is sought resembles the
shape most likely to be taken by the product in question, the greater the likelihood of
the shape being devoid of any distinctive character.”55 In contrast, “only a sign which
departs significantly from the norm or customs of the sector and thereby fulfills its
essential function of indicating origin”56 is not devoid of any distinctiveness. The
combined effect of the normative presumption and the modified test is to make it
harder for applicants to claim inherent source significance for those unconventional
categories of marks than it is regarding word/figurative marks. Strictly speaking,
however such unconventional marks are not “shapes.” On the other hand, settled
case-law states that the formal categorization of a sign as a figurative mark, be it
three-dimensional or otherwise, a positional colour mark or “other” undefined
category, is not a decisive factor for assessing its inherent source-identifying capacity
in the eyes of average consumers.57 The CJEU has accepted the principle that the
decisive factor is not so much a mark’s formal classification as its intrinsic
characteristics of being indistinguishable or indissociable from the appearance of the
designated goods.
This indissociability criterion implies “the existence of a
resemblance between the sign and the products, or some of the products, it covers,”
and the connection must be perceptible by the relevant public.58 This is not an
abstract evaluation; it requires a close examination of the nature of the goods. Nor is
that connection dependent upon an objective impossibility of technical separation.59
Indissociability is therefore a central criterion for applying the case-law and
principles developed around three-dimensional marks, particularly the empirical rule
Dyson v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2007 E.C.R. I-51 (¶ 38).
Id. (Opinion of AG Léger, at ¶ 88).
53 For a discussion of this unexplored distinctiveness test, see Cesar J. Ramirez-Montes, Trade
Marking the Look and Feel of Business Environments in Europe, 25 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 75, 103-109
(2019).
54 Case C-417/16, August Storck KG v. EUIPO, 2017 E.C.R. I-340 (¶ 34) (packaging mark); Case
C-26/17, Birkenstock Sales GmbH v. EUIPO, 2018 E.C.R. I-714 (¶ 32) (wavy patter mark).
55 Case C-445/13, Voss of Norway ASA v. OHIM, 2015 E.C.R. I-303 (¶ 91).
56 Case C-417/16, August Storck KG v. EUIPO, 2017 E.C.R. I-340 (¶ 35); Case C-26/17,
Birkenstock Sales GmbH v. EUIPO, 2018 E.C.R. I-714 (¶ 33).
57 Case C-429/10, X Technology Swiss GmbH v OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. I-307 (¶ 33). See also,
Birkenstock Sales GmbH v. EUIPO, 2018 E.C.R. I-714 (¶ 36).
58 Case C-26/17, Birkenstock Sales GmbH v. EUIPO, 2018 E.C.R. I-714 (¶ 37).
59 Id. (Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 49).
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about consumer perception underpinning the “departs significantly” test. Moreover,
the Court has recently confirmed the lower threshold for the application of the
indissociability criterion to surface pattern marks that enhance the aesthetic
appearance of goods, largely on the policy concern that the applicant’s categorization
of the mark as submitted should not escape the more demanding conditions for
assuming source identification.60
This technique enables EU tribunals to capture instances where the applicant’s
tactical move is "to claim that a mark belongs to a more conventional category” and
thus “bypass substantive examination criteria based upon policy concerns.”61 The
normative rules underpinning the “departs significantly” criterion have proved a
significant obstacle for a broad range of unconventional product trade dress brands.62
The CJEU has yet to articulate the policy concerns underpinning its modified
distinctiveness test. Yet as I have argued elsewhere, the normative presumption
about consumer visual habits constitutes a control device in the sense of being the
Court’s unarticulated policy as a (temporary) measure for maintaining unrestricted
access to basic or fundamental design standards and ordinary features common to
the trade, thereby supporting product market competition.63 This pro-competition
policy makes it difficult for trade dress claims to succeed simply on the basis of
novelty or unusualness. This is by no means a permanent or insurmountable
measure as applicant can always invest in developing source significance.64 While in
practice unconventional marks (including “shapes”) usually need market use before
producing evidence of secondary meaning for protection, distinctiveness is not
60 Id. (¶ 40) (upholding the ‘mere possibility’ criterion that the figurative mark–displaying a
repetitive sequence of elements–will be used as a surface pattern for the relevant goods and thus
indissociable from their appearance.).
61 Dev Gangjee, supra note 39, at ¶ 73.
62 It is clearly applicable beyond the traditional categories of product shapes and product
packaging. For instance, single colour marks, see Christian Louboutin v. Van Haren Shoenen BV,
2018 E.C.R. I-423 (Second Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 64); For position marks, see also Case C521/13, Think Schuhwerk GmbH v. OHIM, 2014 E.C.R. I-2222 (red aglets on shoe laces); Case C429/10, X Technology Swiss GmbH v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. 307 (orange colouring of the toe of a sock);
Case T-433/12, Margarete Steiff GmbH v. OHIM, 2014 E.C.R. II-8 (metal button in the middle
section of the ear of a soft toy); Case T-331/12, Sartorius Lab Instruments GmbH & Co. KG v.
OHIM, 2014 E.C.R. II-87 (yellow curve at the bottom edge of an electronic display unit); Case T152/07, Lange Uhren GmbH v. OHIM, 2009 E.C.R. II-324 (geometric shapes on a watch-face). For
designs applied to the surface of the goods, see Case C-445/02, Graverbel v. OHIM, 2004 E.C.R. 393,
(surface decoration); Case C-307/11, Deichmann SE v. OHIM, 2012 E.C.R. I-254 (stitching applied to
shoes). For pattern marks, see Case T-359/12, LVM v. Nanu-Nana Handelsgesellschaft mbH für
Geschenkartikel & Co. KG, 2015 E.C.R. II-215; Case T-360/12, LVM v. Nanu-Nana
Handelsgesellschaft mbH für Geschenkartikel & Co. KG, 2015 E.C.R. II-214 (chequerboard patterns
applied to leather goods) aff’d Case C-363/15 & C-364/15, LVM v. Nanu-Nana Handelsgesellschaft
mbH für Geschenkartikel & Co. KG 2016 E.C.R. I-595 (court order without decision as parties
settled amicably); Case T-376/10, V. Fraas GmbH v. OHIM, 2012 E.C.R. II-436 (¶ 64) (tartan
pattern in dark grey, light grey, black, beige, dark red and light red). For the presentational method
of the surface of bottles, see Case C-344/10, Freixenet SA v. OHIM 2011 E.C.R. I-680; Case C-345/10,
Freixenet SA v. OHIM 2011 E.C.R. I-680 (joined with Case C-344/10).
63 Cesar J. Ramirez-Montes, Trade Marking the Look and Feel of Business Environments in
Europe, 25 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 75, 106 (2019).
64 See EU Directive 2008/95/EC, art. 3(3), 2008 O.J. (L 299) 25 (EU), which is now Art.4(4)
(recast) Directive 2015/2436, art. 4(4), 2015 O.J. (L 336) 1 (EU); Regulation 2017/1001, art. 7(3), O.J.
(L 154) (EU).
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intended to play the greatest role in safeguarding competition. That is the role of
functionality, and under EU law the tripartite functionality criteria constitute “a
preliminary obstacle” that may permanently prevent registration of shapes.65 The
next section examines each of these criteria under (ex)Art.3(1)(e)(now Art.4(1)(e))
Directive and Art.7(1)(e) ETMR.
III. PART II
A. Shape (or Another Characteristic) that Results from the Nature of the Goods
Themselves
The first criterion for excluding functional signs–shapes resulting from the
nature of the goods themselves–has not featured prominently in reported decisions.
Up until the CJEU’s ruling in Hauck, the precise meaning and normative content of
this criterion was for all intents and purposes unknown. Isolated decisions at OHIM
(now EUIPO) described it as prohibiting “unavoidable shape” marks in the sense of
excluding “the shape imposed by the nature of the goods themselves and without
which those goods would not exist.”66 Unavoidable shapes meant the “the shape of
natural goods or those which have become standardized in trade and in consumer
opinion.”67 In other words, shapes created by nature or standardized by law. For
commentators, the banning of natural shapes of the goods themselves was initially
understood to constitute “the purest example of the principles that trade mark
protection shall not be used to foreclose markets.”68 It was thus interpreted as
precluding protection only if there was evidence of no other shape available for
products of the same species.
Examples of the concerns underpinning this
permanent foreclosure situation included applications for an oval shape designating
balls or natural shapes such as the shape of a banana for bananas. However, in the
wake of Hauk, it has become clear that the normative content of this criterion has a
much broader scope. Hauck concerned the design of a children’s high chair called the
“Tripp-Trapp” chair that was protected both as a registered mark and as an artistic
copyright work. In an infringement action, defendant Hauck counterclaimed raising
functionality as an invalidity ground. In its reply to several referred questions, the
CJEU ruled that the natural signs criterion is not limited to shapes that are
indispensable to the function of the goods but “may [also] apply to a sign which
consists exclusively of the shape of a product with one or more essential
characteristics which are inherent to the generic function or functions of that product

Case C-215/14, Société des Produits Nestlé SA v. Cadbury UK, 2015 E.C.R. I-604 (¶ 38).
Salvatore Ferragamo Italia, Case R-272/1999-3, 3rd Board of Appeal, May 3, 2000, OFF.
HARMONIZATION INTERNAL MKT. ¶ 24 (unreported); Salvatore Ferragamo Italia, Case R-395/1999-3,
3rd Board of Appeal, May 3, 2000, OFF. HARMONIZATION INTERNAL MKT. ¶ 24 (unreported).
67 Salvatore Ferragamo Italia, Case R-272/1999-3, 3rd Board of Appeal, May 3, 2000, OFF.
HARMONIZATION INTERNAL MKT. ¶ 24 (unreported); Salvatore Ferragamo Italia, Case R-395/1999-3,
3rd Board of Appeal, May 3, 2000, OFF. HARMONIZATION INTERNAL MKT. ¶ 24 (unreported).
68 ANNETTE KUR & MARTIN SEFTLEBEN, EUROPEAN TRADE MARK LAW, A COMMENTARY 163
(2017).
65
66
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and which consumers may be looking for in the products of competitors.”69 The Court
clarified that the three functionality exclusions share the same unifying rationale,
namely to keep in the public domain essential characteristics of products which are
reflected in their shape and which rivals need to compete effectively.70 EU
functionality doctrine is therefore largely underpinned by the same competition
concerns as US functionality.71
Hauck therefore clarified that the natural shapes exclusion covers three
situations: a) “natural” products which have no substitute, i.e. the shape of a banana
for bananas; b) “regulated” products which are prescribed by legal standards, i.e. a
rugby ball, and c) “generic” designs, that is, “shapes with essential characteristics
which are inherent to the generic function or functions of such goods . . . .”72 The
Court’s reasoning follows very closely the Opinion of the AG, who took the view that
the natural signs criterion cannot be limited to standard shapes or shapes which are
determined by regulation. According to the AG, such a regulated shape of the goods
is likely to be non-distinctive which would fail under (ex-)Art.3(1)(b) and it cannot
have been the intention of the legislator to duplicate the same exclusionary ground.
Some commentators are critical of the Court’s interpretation. They complain that it
raises the question of how the first criterion (natural shapes) relates to the second
criterion (shape necessary to achieve a technical result).73 This allegedly causes
particular uncertainty because the generic function(s) that consumers expect the
shape of the branded product to perform comes very close to the normative content of
the shape whose essential functional characteristics are all linked to a technical
solution that consumers may look for in the products of competitors. Their second
complaint is that Hauck blurs the distinction between shapes that are merely nondistinctive (for which protection may be temporarily denied until a showing of
secondary meaning) and those that may fall under the criterion’s scope (for which
protected is denied indefinitely).74 As discussed in Part I, non-inherently distinctive
shapes are excluded if they fail to depart significantly from the norm or customs of
the sector. However, according to these critics, “shapes conforming to the norms and
customs of the sector are exactly those that consumers will be looking for in the
products of competitors.”75
Thus, the borderline between permanent and
(potentially) temporary exclusions is blurred.
There are several problems with these criticisms. Firstly, the absolute grounds
for refusing registration share a high degree of internal overlap,76 which reflects the
wider function of trade mark law to protect the marketplace in several ways. Thus, if
a shape mark is descriptive of the artefact, it infringes not only descriptiveness in
Case C-205/13, Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (¶ 27).
Id. (¶ 20) (citing with approval Opinion of AG Szupnar, at ¶ 28).
71 W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir, 1985) (Hon. J. Posner stating that
the characteristic oval shape of an American football may be functional for the same reasons, i.e. it
would be found in all or most brands of the product.).
72 Case C-205/13, Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (¶¶ 24-25).
73 ANNETTE KUR & MARTIN SEFTLEBEN, EUROPEAN TRADE MARK LAW, A COMMENTARY 163
(2017).
74 Id. at 164.
75 Id.
76 Case C-51/10, Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol sp. z o.o. v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. I-139 (¶ 47);
Case C-363/99, Koninklijke KPN Nederland NV v. Benelux-Merkenbureau, 2004 E.C.R. I-86 (¶ 67)
(Postkantoor).
69
70
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(ex-)Art.3(1)(c) but also the natural shapes exclusion in (ex-)Art.3(1)(e)(i).77
Similarly, shape-of-product marks that are necessary to achieve a technical result
under (ex-)Art.3(1)(e)(ii) may also be excluded under the grounds that they indicate
the purpose of the goods (descriptive), are generic (customary) and/or cannot function
as source-identifiers for consumers (non-distinctive). Secondly, according to settled
case-law, the absolute grounds for refusal are broadly divided into two categories,
namely those that view non-registrability from the perspective of average consumers
(general distinctiveness criterion) and those that protect market competition by
keeping certain signs free in the public domain because their permanent registration
may affect the ability of others to offer competing products (functionality criteria).78
The latter grounds require an objective assessment, for which consumer perception is
not decisive but, at most, may be one factor amongst many others.79 The perception
of the target consumers is taken as a basis for assessing the significant departure of
the shape mark and whether, by way of a prognosis decision, the shape or design
claimed as a mark correlates to what consumers would expect the designated goods
to take. By contrast, the identification of the essential characteristics of the shape to
appraise whether they are all inherent to the generic function(s) that the goods are
intended to perform is an objective appraisal. Secondly, whilst it is true that the
broader interpretation endorsed in Hauck focuses upon the practical generic
function(s) of the goods, this is not the same as the need for a “technical effect” as
required for utilitarian shapes in (ex-)Art.3(1)(e)(ii). Indeed, in his “instructive”80
Opinion, the AG stressed that certain generic characteristics of a shape may have a
particularly significant effect upon the function that a product performs. Thus,
“[t]hey can also be characteristics of a shape which are difficult to identify as
necessary to obtain a ‘technical effect’ within the meaning of the second indent” of
(ex-)Art.3(1)(e)(ii).81 This is a central distinction often overlooked in opinions
suggesting that Hauck’s interpretation creates an overlap in which the first
exclusionary criterion arguably contains a much broader concept than the second.82
Nevertheless, those generic characteristics affecting substantially the function of
the product concerned are also features which consumers are likely to seek in the
products of all competitors. Echoing an economic effects assessment, the AG Opinion
highlighted that “they are features of a shape for which there is no equally good
substitute” and their monopolization by a single trader “would make it difficult for
competing undertakings to give the goods a shape which was equally suitable for

77 Uma Suthersanen, supra note 32, at 275 (“Art.3(1)(e) and the distinctiveness criterion are
two facets which combine to ensure the proper functioning of the marketplace by excluding shapes
which, if protected, would ‘function’ physically and/or conceptually to narrow the choices available to
other market traders.”).
78 Case C-205/13, Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (¶ 33) (citing Lego
Juris v OHIM, at ¶ 75, and Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 88).
79 Id. (¶¶ 34-35)
80 LIONAL BENTLY ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 964 (5th ed. 2018).
81 Case C-205/13, Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (Opinion of AG
Szpunar, at ¶ 56)
82 Anton Quaedvlieg, Shapes With a Technical Function: An Ever-Expanding Exclusion?, 1 ERA
FORUM 101, 115 (2016) (arguing that the generic function criterion underpinning the CJEU’s
interpretation of the natural shapes exclusion could have a far broader reach than the technical
necessity exclusion itself.); KUR & SENFTLEBEN, supra note 68, at 164.
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use.”83 The CJEU agreed, evoking the criterion’s public interest aim in preventing
the trade mark proprietor obtaining a significant advantage.84 It is entirely unclear
why the potential for a (negative) overlap between the natural shapes criterion and
the non-distinctiveness objections should cause significant uncertainty. To start
with, where several of the absolute grounds for refusal may apply it is mandatory to
undertake a prior functionality assessment of the proposed trade dress mark.
Indeed, functionality is a preliminary obstacle to the registration of all shapes
despite its position within the legislation and, once there is a functionality finding,
there is no need to consider further the potential for source-identifying potential
since functional shapes can never be saved by demonstrating source significance.
This is not to say that post-Hauck the CJEU’s articulation has resulted in “a
useful guideline on which courts and offices can base their decision.”85 Kur and
Sentfleben have referred to the Nestlé SA v Cadbury reference and the Best-Lock
(Europe) v Lego Juris A/S appeal as examples where, had the Hauck criteria for
excluding natural shapes been properly applied, a different set of results might have
emerged. In Nestlé SA v Cadbury, the contested shape of the Kit-Kat four-fingered
chocolate bar was found to contain three essential features, the slab form (which
resulted from the nature of the goods themselves) and the V-shaped grooves
separating the four fingers (which were necessary to achieve a technical result).86
For these authors, pursuant to the Hauck’s expansive interpretation of the natural
shapes criterion, both the slab shape and the presence and number of grooves are
inherent in the generic function of the product, i.e. to be eaten in portions.87 Similar
considerations might apply to the shape of the little Lego man or “manikins”
registered as EUTMs. In this case, Best-lock requested the cancellation of the
registration on the basis that the shape of the Lego man was determined by the
nature of the goods themselves and it was also necessary to provide the technical
solution of joining the toy figures (through holes under its feet) to Lego toy bricks.
The Board rejected the request, largely on the ground that the applicant Best-lock
had neither offered evidence of functionality nor developed arguments properly.88
The GCEU dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the essential characteristics of the
Lego man trade mark (i.e. head, body, arms and legs which are necessary to confer a
human appearance) did not serve any technical result. Moreover, “the result of that
shape [was] simply to confer human traits on the figure” and “the fact that the figure
ha[d] technical qualities ha[d] no influence in the context of applying Art.7(1)(e)(ii).”89
However, according to Kur and Senftleben, had it been considered that the stylized
shape of the Lego man shape displayed the very features that consumers expect of
such toy figures, the result would most likely have been different. Indeed, the
essential characteristics may be inherent to the generic function of the manikins, i.e.
83 Case C-205/13, Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (Opinion of AG
Szpunar, at ¶ 57-58).
84 Id.
85 KUR & SENFTLEBEN, supra note 68, at 163.
86 Case C-215/14, Société des Produits Nestlé SA v. Cadbury UK, 2015 E.C.R. I-604 (¶ 72).
87 KUR & SENFTLEBEN, supra note 68, at 164.
88 Case T-395/14, Best-Lock (Europe) v. Lego Juris A/S, 2015 E.C.R. II-379 (¶ 7).
89 Case T-395/14, Best-Lock (Europe) v. Lego Juris A/S, 2015 E.C.R. II-379 (¶¶ 35, 38).
A
further appeal to the CJEU was dismissed by a [brief] reasoned order, see Case C-452/15, Best-Lock
(Europe) v. Lego Juris A/S, 2016 E.C.R. I-270.
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to confer human traits on the toy figures, contrary to the natural shapes exclusion.
Moreover, it is common in EU law to find cases where distinctiveness rather than
functionality is called upon to refuse registration of shape marks resulting from the
nature of the goods themselves.90
B. Shape (or Another Characteristic) Necessary to Obtain a Technical Result
The criterion for excluding technical shapes is by far the most common obstacle
for product trade dress marks. It was also the first criterion to offer the CJEU the
initial opportunity to articulate the policies underpinning the European functionality
doctrine, the assessment method and the doctrine’s relationship with the other
general requirements of distinctiveness. Unsurprisingly, there is far more case-law
around technical functionality than on any other of the criteria in indents (i) and (iii).
The Court nonetheless has yet to interpret the new wording of functional
“characteristics” in cases involving non-shape functionality. The leading judgements
on essentially functional shapes are Remington91 and Lego,92 both of which concerned
challenges to the registrations of shape marks that had previously been protected by
other IP rights. Since these two rulings, there are have been more recent cases that
have shed more light onto the proper application of the utilitarian functionality
criteria and the doctrine’s limits. According to Remington, a sign consists exclusively
of a shape necessary to achieve a technical result “where the essential functional
characteristics of the shape of a product are attributable solely to the technical
result . . .even if that result can be achieved by other shapes.”93 Lego affirmed this
interpretation, clarifying further that technical functionality applies “only where all
the essential characteristics of the sign are functional.”94
Lego overwhelmingly confirmed the principle first articulated in Remington that
European functionality is not grounded upon competitive necessity. The policy
concern of the EU functionality doctrine is not the competitive need of traders to copy
functional product features for effective competition in the market concerned but on a
much broader principle of avoiding undue competitive advantages which are
unrelated to competition based upon price and quality.95 This is so despite the
potential for availability of alternative designs, consumer confusion and loss of
business goodwill. This echoes the same approach adopted by the US Supreme Court
in Traffix.96 Thus, the CJEU rejected Lego’s complaint that its competitors need not
offer slavish copies of its Lego bricks incorporating exactly the same technical
90 Case C-476/15, Grupo Bimbo v. OHIM, 2016 E.C.R. I-165 (application to register the shape of
a Mexican tortilla for snacks.).
91 Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v. Remington, 2002 E.C.R. I-377.
92 Case C-48/09, Lego Juris A/S v. Mega Brands, 2010 E.C.R. I-516.
93 Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v. Remington, 2002 E.C.R. I-377 (¶ 83)
(emphasis added).
94 Case C-48/09, Lego Juris A/S v. Mega Brands, 2010 E.C.R. I-516 (¶ 52) (emphasis added).
95 Case C-205/13, Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (Opinion of AG
Szpunar, at ¶ 79).
96 In fact, the Opinion of the AG and the Grand Board of Appeal at the EUIPO cited Traffix in
their functionality assessments. See Case C-48/09, Lego Juris A/S v. Mega Brands, 2010 E.C.R. I516 (Opinion of AG Mengozzi, at ¶ 67).
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solution.97 Claims of mere slavish imitation by competitors cannot alter the
“particular strictness” of the legislature’s policy choice.98 Furthermore, Lego provides
more guidance on the criteria for identifying the essential characteristics of a shape
mark.99 The first step is to identify all the essential characteristics of the 3D mark,
that is, “the most important elements of the sign” on a case-by-case basis without any
hierarchy between its constituent elements.100 Thus, depending on the degree of
difficulty, the essential characteristics can be identified either by a simple visual
analysis or a more detailed examination consisting of surveys or expert reports
including information about other IP rights previously granted. However, unlike
distinctiveness evaluations, for functionality assessments the presumed perception of
the average consumer “is not a decisive element . . . but, at most, may be a relevant
criterion of assessment” for the tribunal when it identifies the design’s essential
characteristics.101 An additional step still requires the tribunal to ascertain “whether
all [the essential characteristics identified] perform the technical function of the
goods at issue.”102 This is where the presence of a major (non-technical) decorative or
imaginative element becomes relevant but only to the extent that it plays an
important role in the intended technical result.
In Lego, although the colour red was a non-functional element of the design, this
was a minor arbitrary element in its technical result, namely the assembly of toybricks.103 The CJEU therefore endorsed the functionality findings that the most
important element of the Lego brick mark consisted of two rows of studs on the upper
surface of the brick and that element was necessary for the assembly result.
Similarly, in Yoshida the mere fact that the pattern mark with an array of black dots
for knife handles had ornamental and fanciful aspects did not preclude a
functionality finding where such aspects played a minor role in the shape of the
designated goods.104 The CJEU thus endorsed the finding that those black dots were
not merely colouring painted onto the handles but actual dents on the surface of the
handles, which constituted an essential characteristic of the non-skid technical
solution of the shape. Moreover, Lego and Yoshida highlight the relevance of the
evidence regarding patent and design protection for a functionality finding. For
instance, in Lego the CJEU approved the reliance upon prior patents in assessing the
functionality of the characteristics of the Lego brick.105 Yet the prior Lego patents
were not treated as irrefutable evidence of the Lego brick’s utilitarian functionality
but as “a simple, yet very powerful, presumption that the essential characteristics of

97
98

(¶ 34).

Id. (¶ 59).
Id. (¶ 47). See also, Case C-421/15, Yoshida Metal Industry Co v. EUIPO, 2017 E.C.R. I-360

99 Lego’s two-step test has been subsequently applied and confirmed in other decisions; see Case
C-421/15, Yoshida Metal Industry Co v. EUIPO, 2017 E.C.R. I-360 (¶ 29); Case C-30/15, Simba Toys
v. Seven Towns, 2016 E.C.R. I-849 (¶ 40); Cases C-337/12 to C-340/12, Pi-Design AG v. Yoshida
Metal Industry Co, 2014 E.C.R. I-129 (¶¶ 47-48).
100 Lego Juris A/S v. Mega Brands, 2010 E.C.R. I-516 (¶¶ 69-70).
101 Id. (¶ 76).
102 Id. (¶ 72).
103 Id. (¶¶ 73-74).
104 Case C-421/15, Yoshida Metal Industry Co v. EUIPO, 2017 E.C.R. I-360 (¶ 30).
105 Lego Juris A/S v. Mega Brands, 2010 E.C.R. I-516 (¶ 85).
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the shape . . . perform a technical function.”106 Similarly, in Yoshida all the essential
characteristics identified by the Board at the EUIPO were disclosed in two American
and European Patents that the proprietor had previously obtained.107 This too was a
strong presumption of utilitarian functionality.
Case-law has also thwarted traders’ attempts to circumvent the fatal blow of
functionality by classifying the sign as a figurative mark representing a twodimensional label or omitting a more detailed description of the mark as filed. As
discussed in Part I, this tactical behavior enables traders to assert that their marks
do not constitute the “shape of goods” and cannot therefore be excluded on
functionality grounds. However, the CJEU has ruled that a correct application of the
policies pursued by functionality (anti-monopoly and freedom to compete) requires
consideration, where appropriate, of information about the function of the actual
goods in addition to the graphic representation and any descriptions filed at the time
of the grant of registration.108 The representation of the mark as filed cannot restrict
the examiner’s evaluation of a potential functionality objection in such a way as
might undermine the public interest underlying that provision.109 Thus, in PiDesign, the CJEU rejected the interpretation that “only the shape as reproduced in
the registration application may be the subject-matter of the [functionality]
examination.”110 Instead it endorsed the possibility that examiners may carry out a
form of reverse engineering, i.e. finding out what the trade mark really represents on
the basis of representations of the knives actually marketed by the proprietor.111 In a
recent appeal involving cancellation proceedings against registration of the famous
Rubik’s Cube as a EUTM, the CJEU had opportunity to clarify further the relevance
of additional circumstances relating to the function of the actual goods beyond the
requisite representation of the mark as submitted for registration, which is essential
for the application of functionality. In reversing the non-functionality findings, the
CJEU in Simba Toys held that the assessment of the essential characteristics
identified (i.e. the grid structure on each surface of the cube) must refer to “the
technical function of the actual goods concerned.”112 It was therefore contrary to
settled case-law to disregard knowledge of the rotating capability of the vertical and
horizontal lattices of the Rubik’s Cube, notwithstanding the fact that this invisible
mechanism internal to that cube could not be inferred objectively from the graphical
representation of the mark as registered. Simba Toys affirmed the principle
supported in PI-Design that, though the shape as represented graphically should be
the basis for a functionality assessment, the analysis cannot proceed in the abstract
“without using additional information on the actual goods.”113 In determining the
106 Case C-48/09, Lego Juris A/S v. Mega Brands, 2010 E.C.R. I-516 (Opinion of AG Mengozzi,
at ¶ 67).
107 Cases T-331/10 to T-416/10, Yoshida Metal Industry Co v. OHIM, 2015 E.C.R. II-302 (¶ 46).
108 Cases C-337/12 to C-340/12, Pi-Design AG v. Yoshida Metal Industry Co, 2014 E.C.R. I-129
(¶ 54).
109 Id. (¶ 58).
110 Case T-331/10, Yoshida Metal Industry Co v. OHIM, 2015 E.C.R. II-302 (¶ 31); Case T416/10, Yoshida Metal Industry Co v. OHIM, 2015 E.C.R. II-302 (¶ 31).
111 Cases C-337/12 to C-340/12, Pi-Design AG v. Yoshida Metal Industry Co, 2014 E.C.R. I-129
(¶ 61).
112 Case C-30/15, Simba Toys v. Seven Towns, 2016 E.C.R. I-849 (¶ 46).
113 Id. (¶ 48).
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true scope of the EU functionality doctrine, it is necessary always to consider the
overriding policy concerns of (ex)Art.3(1)(e)/Art/7(1)(e). Thus, the narrow view
adopted by the lower tribunals imposed “an excessively high standard on the
assessment of functional shapes which makes it possible to circumvent the
prohibition on monopolization” under the statutory provision.114
There are other problematic decisions however where the expression “technical
result” in the EU functionality doctrine has not been interpreted as broadly as one
might expect. In considering the alleged utilitarian functionality of the shape of the
Kit Kat four finger chocolate-coated bar, the evidence before the examiner indicated
that the angle of the sides of the product (and of the breaking grooves) was
constrained by the specific method of manufacture.115 That manufacturing method is
the most common and efficient chocolate molding process for multiple finger
chocolate bar products.116 This prompted the national court to ask the CJEU
whether the scope of the utilitarian shapes exclusion is restricted to the manner in
which the relevant goods function or whether it also extends to the method of
manufacturing the goods. That is, whether utilitarian functionality covers both
kinds of technical results, i.e. signs that are causally associated with the
functionality of the branded goods as well as signs that are the expression of a
particular manufacturing method. Following a strict reading of the statutory text,
the CJEU replied that extending utilitarian functionality to the manufacturing
method for producing the goods is unsupported by the wording itself and by the
overriding policy of the provision. Functionality’s overriding aim is to prevent a
monopoly on technical solutions which a user is likely to seek in the goods of
competitors. Thus, “from the consumer’s perspective, the manner in which the goods
function is decisive and the method of manufacture is not important.”117
The CJEU’s strict interpretation is in stark contrast with the proposed
interpretation in the Opinion of its own Advocate General. For AG Wathelet, a
teleological interpretation of the provision could not logically ignore the contribution
of the manufacturing process to the technical result attributed to the shape of the
goods. Accordingly, “it is possible . . . that that technical result may be obtainable
only by means of a specific manufacturing process,” as was the case in Nestlé.118 The
Advocate General recalled that the Court’s own description of the aim of the grounds
in (ex)Art.3(1)(e) speaks of concerns that the exclusivity inherent in trade mark
rights would “limit the possibility of competitors supplying a product incorporating [a
technical] function or at least limit their freedom of choice in regard to the technical
solution they wish to adopt in order to incorporate such as function in their
114

¶ 95).

Case C-30/15, Simba Toys v. Seven Towns, 2016 E.C.R. I-849 (Opinion of AG Szpunar, at

115 Case C-215/14, Société des Produits Nestlé SA v. Cadbury UK, 2015 E.C.R. I-604 (Opinion of
AG Wathelet, at ¶ 75); Id. (¶ 67).
116
Apostolos Chronopolous, De Jure Functionality of Shapes Driven by Technical
Considerations in Manufacturing Methods, 3 IP QUARTERLY 286, 289-291 (2017) (explaining the
efficiencies of this moulding process that Nestle uses for its Kit Kat four-finger chocolate bar).
117 Case C-215/14, Société des Produits Nestlé SA v. Cadbury UK, 2015 E.C.R. I-604 (¶ 55); Id.
(¶ 56) (In support of this narrow view, the CJEU further noted that the manufacturing method is
not decisive to the assessment of the essential functional characteristics of a product shape).
118 Société des Produits Nestlé SA v. Cadbury UK, 2015 E.C.R. I-604 (Opinion of AG Wathelet,
at ¶ 75).
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product.”119 In his view, the conjunction “or” implies that utilitarian functionality
covers two distinct situations, the latter of which paraphrases “manufacturing
process.”120 There is support amongst European scholars for this teleological
argument. For some scholars, the term “technical result” may include “different
types of technical results including manufacturing efficiencies.”121 A purposive
interpretation that excludes shapes that are associated with a specific manufacturing
method is, apart from being teleologically justified, within the textual limits of the
provision.122 To support their purposive arguments, European scholars draw
attention to US law, which “explicitly takes into account the effect of trade dress
protection on the practice of unpatented manufacturing processes within the context
of functionality analysis.”123 Indeed, under US law, a product feature is functional
and cannot serve as a trade mark “if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article
or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”124 In particular, a functional feature
affects the cost or quality of the article where “it permits the article to be
manufactured at a lower cost” or “constitutes an improvement in the operation of the
goods.”125 Therefore, if the overriding aim of EU functionality is to preserve the
absolute freedom of competitors, it is then hard to see why “technical result” cannot
cover shapes that are closely associated with a manufacturing process that is the
superior method for producing the relevant goods, as was the case with the Kit Kat
chocolate bar.
C. Shape (or Another Characteristic) that Adds Substantial Value to the Goods
This criterion has been described as “arbitrary and difficulty to apply,”126 having
the same sort of “over-breadth problem”127 as the Pagliero approach to aesthetic
functionality. In a recent Opinion, AG Szpunar put it bluntly by complaining that it
“is not worded clearly,” largely due to a lack of uniform views as to its true meaning
and purpose.128 Indeed, it raises difficult questions of interpretation such as what is
the “value” prohibited, which assessment criteria render the value “substantial,” and
Id. (Opinion of AG Wathelet, at ¶ 76) (AG Opinion’s own emphasis).
Id. (Opinion of AG Wathelet, at ¶ 77).
121 Apostolos Chronopolous, supra note 116, at 297.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 296 (discussing the Morton-Norwich factors for determining utilitarian functionality,
one of which specifically asks whether ‘a particular design results from a comparatively simple or
cheap method of manufacturing the article.’).
124 Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28 (2001) (quoting Inwood
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S. 844, 850, n. 10 (1982)).
125 Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent America Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 219 (2nd Cir.
2012).
126 Charles Gielen, Substantial Value Rule: How It Came into Being And Why It Should Be
Abolished, 3 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 164, 168 (2014).
127 Justin Hughes, Non-Traditional Trade Marks and the Dilemma of Aesthetic Functionality, in
THE PROTECTION OF NON-TRADITIONAL MARKS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 107, 111 (Irene Calboli &
Martin Senftleben eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2018). See also, Justin Hughes, Cognitive and Aesthetic
Functionality in Trade Mark Law, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1227 (2015).
128 Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 69)
(outlining the opposite views that originated in German case-law and scholarship, and in the caselaw of the EUIPO).
119
120
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what is the importance of consumer perspective expressed in consumer
needs/preferences.129 Many have questioned its unclear rationale calling for its
abolition or amendment.130 Nonetheless, in the wake of the 2015 legislative revision,
these hostile opinions went unheeded as EU policy-makers tacitly approved its
important role within the trade mark system. Prior to Hauck, the teleological
premise widely adopted was that this criterion (also described as “aesthetic
functionality”) seeks to demarcate trade mark protection and the protection offered
by other time-limited IP rights such as copyright and designs. However, this widelyheld view resulted in different interpretative approaches. While one purposive
interpretation treated the criterion as solely applying to works of art and applied art
which permits the registration of product shapes that could also perform a utilitarian
function (i.e. the design of a chair or an armchair), another purposive view argued
that a finding that the shape gives substantial value to the goods does not preclude
other characteristics (i.e. technical qualities of a loudspeaker) from also adding
substantial value to those goods.131 For the latter view, the fact that a product
performs a decorative as well as a practical function does not automatically rule out
the possibility of applying the criterion. Underlying this more inclusive view is a
recognition that product features may perform multiple functions; apart from their
practical function, they can also satisfy other consumer needs.132 In Hauck, the AG
Opinion proposed adopting the more inclusive purposive interpretation as this
permits the overriding aim of the statutory provision to be fulfilled, namely to
prevent the misuse of trade mark law exclusively for purposes which other IP
regimes serve to attain.133 More broadly, to prevent the registration of nonfunctional aesthetic features that are essential for effective competition in the
relevant market in the sense that consumers may seek them in the products of
competitors.
The CJEU ruling in Hauck closely follows the Opinion of its AG. According to
the ruling, the concept of “shape which gives substantial value to the goods” cannot
“be limited to the shape of products having only artistic or ornamental value, as there
is otherwise a risk that products which have essential functional characteristics as
well as a significant aesthetic element will not be covered.”134 This goes beyond what
was argued before, i.e. that the criterion’s rationale serves to demarcate between
design, copyright and trademarks, and affirms “the competition leitmotiv” within all
three functionality criteria.135 According to this view, an artefact may be protected
under different rights without much ado as long as it satisfies specific protection
criteria, which are underpinned with “an aligned supra-rationale, i.e. ensuring
129 The London Taxi Co v. Frazer-Nash Research Ltd [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1729 [76] (Eng.)
(Floyd LJ identifying some difficulties).
130 Charles Gielen, supra note 126, at 167; MAX PLANK INSTITUTE, Study on the Overall
Functioning
of
the
European
Trade
Mark
System,
§ 2.34
(2011)
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/tm/20110308_allensbach-study_en.pdf.
131 Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (Opinion of AG Szpunar, at
¶¶ 72-77).
132 Id. (Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 85).
133 Id. (Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 79).
134 Id. (¶ 32).
135 Uma Suthersanen, Excluding Designs (and Shape Marks): Where Is the EU Court of Justice
Going?, 50 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 157, 159 (2019).
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protection under these regimes does not restrict market freedom and competition.”136
This permanent exclusion may thus cover out-of-copyright artworks (i.e. visual works
and sculptures)137 and certain collector’s items138 but this is not the only situation
envisaged. It also extends to “all other practical objects in respect of which design is
one of the fundamental elements which determine their attractiveness, and thus the
market success of the goods concerned.”139 Obvious examples are jewelry or fine
cutlery but also products in relation to which the external aesthetics of the shape
play an essential role in a certain segment of the market, i.e. designer furniture and
certain designer goods.140 In Hauck, the shape of the Tripp-Trapp children’s chair
was found to give significant aesthetic value in addition to having other
characteristics (safety, comfort and reliability), which gave it essential functional
value.141 The ruling therefore offered an interpretation of a “blended shape,” i.e. one
with “several characteristics.” As regards the relevance of the motive(s) underlying
the target public’s decision to purchase the shape, the CJEU simply repeated what it
had already established in Lego, namely how the target public perceives the product
shape cannot constitute a decisive element.142
The perspective of consumer
motivation/need is merely one of several factors in identifying the “value” that the
shape confers upon the goods. Therefore, in addition to consumer perception, the
CJEU went on to endorse other criteria proposed in the Opinion of the AG for
determining whether the aesthetic value of a shape becomes “substantial” and thus
ineligible for registration.143
Hauck undoubtedly represents an expansion of the criteria for applying the legal
test of aesthetic functionality under (ex-) Art.3(1)(e)(iii). The ruling nonetheless
leaves several important questions answered. Firstly, the CJEU did not articulate a
positive definition of the “shape that gives substantial value to the goods” concept.
Nor did it define what type of “value” tribunals must look for in the shape. Is it
“monetary” value or some other quality? Is it the “value” derived from the
proprietor’s reputation, or is it the intrinsic value of the design alone irrespective of
Id. at 160.
Case E-5/16, Municipality of Oslo v. Norwegian Board of Appeal for Industrial Property
Rights, 2017 E.F.T.A. 6th April 2017, (unreported) https://eftacourt.int/download/5-16judgment/?wpdmdl=1649. For comment on this dispute, see European Copyright Society, Trade
Mark Protection for Public Domain Works: A Comment on the Request for an Advisory Opinion of the
EFTA Court: Case E-5/16 –Norwegian Board of Appeal for Industrial Property Rights –Appeal from
the Municipality of Oslo, 9 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 535 (2017).
138 Bacardi & Co v. Occhi Blu Foundation, Case R-1313/2012-1, 2nd Board of Appeal, OFF.
HARMONIZATION INTERNAL MKT. ¶ 17 (unreported) (diamond-shaped bottle for alcoholic beverages).
139 Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 81).
140 Id. (Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶¶ 82-85). Under this CJEU’s interpretation, this valueconferring criterion may also cover motor car shapes (see, The London Taxi Co v. Frazer-Nash
Research Ltd [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1729 [73] (Eng.)) and the shape of a loudspeaker (see Case T508/08, Bang & Olufsen v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. II-575).
141 Hauck GmbH & Co. KG, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (¶ 29)
142 Hauck GmbH & Co. KG, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (¶ 34) (Consumer perception may, at most, be a
relevant criterion in identifying the essential characteristic of the sign.).
143 Hauck GmbH & Co. KG, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (¶ 35) (the nature of the category of goods
concerned, the artistic value of the shape in question, its dissimilarity from other shapes in common
use on the market concerned, a substantial price difference in relation to similar products, and the
development of a promotion strategy which focuses on accentuating the aesthetic characteristics of
the product in question.).
136
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brand reputation? If so, how are tribunals to separate one from the other? There are
references to “attractiveness,” “appeal” and “aesthetic qualities” as strongly
influencing consumer’s decision to purchase and thus as proxies for increasing the
economic “value” of the goods in the Opinion of AG Spzunar.144 This dangerously
echoes Pagliero’s “important ingredient” test of aesthetic functionality widely
criticized in US law.145 Secondly, the CJEU is ambivalent about the relevance of
consumer preferences and consumer needs in determining whether a shape mark
confers substantial value to the goods. Is it a purely objective test? These
uncertainties are deeply problematic, not least because the Court endorsed the AG
view’s that objects are capable of fulfilling multiple consumer needs in addition to
their practical functions.146 This recognition served as basis for not disapplying the
exclusion when the object performs a decorative as well as a practical function.
Consumer motivation/preferences therefore do have a far greater role in aesthetic
functionality than the CJEU is prepared to acknowledge. In Hauck, the AG
highlighted that consumer perception might be of greater relevance in aesthetic
functionality than in cases of utilitarian functionality, beyond merely identifying the
essential characteristics of the shape.147 In what specific circumstances he did not
elaborate. Nonetheless, he went on to add an important qualification that nudges
European aesthetic functionality away from Pagliero. In his Opinion, the substantial
value assessments must consider consumer perception in a much broader context. In
particular, the need to consider also “the economic effects which will result from
reserving the sign concerned to a single undertaking” in order to answer the
criterion’s ultimate question, i.e. “whether or not registration[] will have a negative
impact on the placing of competing goods on the market.”148
IV. PART III: TOWARDS AN EVOLVING APPROACH TO FUNCTIONALITY?
The opportunity to discuss further the relevance of consumer perception when
excluding protection of shapes for adding substantial value to the goods arose in
Louboutin. As stated above, in a brief decision the CJEU rejected the proposed
interpretation in the two Opinions of AG Szpunar, ruling that “a sign consisting of a
colour applied to the sole of a high-heeled shoe [such as the Louboutin mark], does
not consist exclusively of a ‘shape’ within the meaning of [(ex-)Art.3(1)(e)(iii)
Directive].”149 The question arose because the restrictive wording of this provision
permits functionality exclusions only for “shape,” and it was unclear whether “shape”
is limited to 3D properties of products or can also include other non-3D properties

Hauck GmbH & Co. KG, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶¶ 80, 81, 84, 85).
W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 340 (7th Cir, 1985); Wallace Int’l Silversmiths,
Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., Inc., 916 F.2d 76, 79 (2nd Cir, 1990) (citing cases).
146 Hauck GmbH & Co. KG, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (¶ 31).
147 Hauck GmbH & Co. KG, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (Opinion of AG Szpunar, ¶ 92).
148 Hauck GmbH & Co. KG, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (Opinion of AG Szpunar, ¶ 89).
149 Christian Louboutin v. Van Haren Shoenen BV, 2018 E.C.R. I-423 (¶ 27). The CJEU appears
to consider the description attached by Louboutin when filing for registration as highly relevant for
its decision. However, this is incompatible with the much broader views it adopted in Pi-Design and
Simba Toys.
144
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such as colour.150 In stark contrast to US law that requires non-functionality of all
types of trade dress marks, European tribunals have to engage in this sort of mental
gymnastics which the new wording of Art.4(1)(e) (recast) Directive arguably
addresses. In both Opinions, AG Szpunar argued for a more flexible interpretation of
the undefined concept of “shape” in order to classify the Louboutin red sole mark as
one consisting of “the shape of the goods and seeking protection for a colour in
relation to that shape, rather than one consisting of a colour per se.”151 The
suggested interpretation would permit applying an aesthetic functionality
examination to a mark combining colour and shape (i.e. the Louboutin mark). AG
Szpunar considered several issues for adopting a teleological rather than a literal
interpretation of the aesthetic functionality criterion, but his discussion of the
“dynamic” nature of consumer aesthetic preferences merits close consideration.
According to the AG, there is an important distinction among the types of
functionality prohibited in (ex-)Art.3(1)(e). While functionality excluding natural and
technical shapes “relates to characteristics which have been pre-determined with
lasting effect, namely those which exist by virtue of the goods themselves,”152
functionality excluding value-adding shapes would “relate to [aesthetic]
characteristics which are dependent on external factors”153 and in particular evolving
consumer preferences. In the case of utilitarian shapes, for example, the public’s
perception of the goods is incapable of altering that state of affairs even when
alternative shapes may achieve the same technical result.154 In contrast, when it
comes to the “substantial value” criterion, its proper rationale allows “a characteristic
to remain available for all market participants over the period during which that
characteristic has a particular effect on the value of the goods.”155 However, “from
the point at which that is no longer the case–inter alia . . . because the public’s
preferences have changed and that characteristic is no longer sought and valued by
the public”–the proposed shape mark would no longer potentially be rejected for
being aesthetically functional.156
The AG accepted Louboutin’s arguments that, at least within the aesthetic field,
there is no need to keep aesthetic characteristics that give substantial value to the
goods available on a permanent basis because public preferences may change in line
with fashion trends. This “evolutionary interpretation”157 of aesthetic functionality
acknowledges that “[aesthetic] characteristics do not have a sufficiently long
economic lifetime to justify [permanent] protection”158 and, where they no longer
confer a strong competitive advantage upon one trader, a trade dress mark like that
of Louboutin red sole should not be rejected under this provision. Consequently, an
evolutionary interpretation of the EU doctrine of aesthetic functionality offers the
Christian Louboutin v. Van Haren Shoenen BV, 2018 E.C.R. I-423 (¶ 17).
Id. (Opinion of AG Szpunar, First Opinion at ¶ 22, and Second Opinion ¶ 11).
152 Id. (Second Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 50).
153 Id. (Second Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 52).
154 Id. (Second Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 50).
155 Id. (Second Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 51).
156 Christian Louboutin, 2018 E.C.R. I-423 (Second Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 51).
157 Eleonora Rosatti, AG Szpunar Confirms That There Is a Way Out of Invalidation for the
Louboutin Red Sole Trade Mark, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 518, 520 (2018).
158 Christian Louboutin, 2018 E.C.R. I-423 (Second Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 46) (reporting
Louboutin’s argument, which was similar to that of the German Government at the hearing.).
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advantage of permitting registration where the initial aesthetic appeal becomes
secondary to the source identification subsequently developed by the owner; thus,
brand reputation becomes the conclusive factor for consumers’ choice of the product,
not the design itself.159 There is support in academic literature for the AG’s dynamic
approach to consumer preferences for functionality. According to its supporters, it
avoids the perceived harshness of permanently foreclosing the option of trade mark
protection where consumer demand for the shape is no longer due to its intrinsic
appeal but its strong reputation as a result of successful branding efforts.160 This
perceived harshness is also shared in US quarters.161 A common example of these
harsh consequences is the CJEU’s ruling that the stitch pattern mark widely used by
G-Star in the marketing of its famous Elwood design trousers still infringed the
substantial value criterion where the design’s popularity no longer derived from the
shape itself but was largely attributed to consumers recognizing the shape as a GStar product. 162 In Benetton, G-Star sought to prevent competitor Benetton selling
trousers with similar distinctive stitching but Benetton raised functionality as a
ground for revocation. In affirming Remington, the CJEU rejected the suggestion
that a shape that at first added substantial value to the goods contrary to (ex)Art.3(1)(e)(iii) might nevertheless be protected where, prior to the registration,
consumers’ desire for stitch-patterned jeans came largely from familiarity with the
shape that G-Star made famous.163
Some regard Benetton as formally correct but at the same time, as “a policy-blind
execution of black-letter law.”164 Kur complained that the criterion poses a
problematic dilemma, namely if a shape is aesthetically appealing but also serves a
source-related function and consumers purchase the branded product precisely for
that reason then there is no longer any basis for claiming that its aesthetic
appearance determines the substantial value of the product.165 She argued that a
strict application of the criterion leads to flawed results for another reason. Writing
presciently prior to Hauck and Louboutin, Kur also identified a distinction between
the different functionality criteria and stressed that consumer behaviour to buy the
product under the substantial value criterion entails subjective evaluations that
“make[] it a moving target–more often than not, such evaluations are bound to
159 Lavinia Brancusi, Trade Marks’ Functionality in EU Law: Expected New Trends After the
Louboutin Case, 2 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 98,104 (2019).
160 Annette Kur, Too Pretty to Protect? Trade Mark Law and The Enigma of Aesthetic
Functionality, (Max Planck Inst. for Intell. Prop. & Competition L., Research Paper Series No. 1116, 2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1935289. See also, Annette Kur, Too
Common, Too Splendid, or “Just Right”? Trade Mark Protection for Product Shapes in the Light of
the CJEU’s Case-Law?, (Max Planck Inst. for Intell. Prop. & Competition L., Research Paper Series
No. 14-17, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2526124.
161 Mark McKenna, (Dis) Functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV 823, 854 (2011) (observing that one of
explanation for US courts’ greater reticence about aesthetic functionality is that its consequences
seem too harsh.).
162 Case C-371/06, Benetton Group SpA v. G-Star Int BV, 2007 E.C.R. 542 (the shape marks
consisted of an oval kneepad and two lines of sloping stitching from hip height to crotch height.).
163 Id. (¶ 28).
164 Annette Kur, Too Pretty to Protect? Trade Mark Law and The Enigma of Aesthetic
Functionality, 21 (Max Planck Inst. for Intell. Prop. & Competition L., Research Paper Series No.
11-16, 2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1935289.
165 Id. at 15.
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change with time.”166 Others also endorse utmost caution and advocate including a
“time factor” in all functional exclusions, which “may change the status of certain
product characteristics over the years” as well as consumer expectations.167 For
other European commentators, however, “aspects such as beauty, prettiness or
decorative aspects do not relate to functional characteristics of products” and there is
therefore no compelling need for competitors to use a design like the Elwood jeans.168
It is beyond the scope of this article to scrutinize these arguments properly but
suffice to state the following. Firstly, Hauck rejected a purely subjective consumerbased assessment of the substantial value exclusion in favor of “fundamentally
objective facts,” which demonstrate that exclusivity over a product shape to a single
trader hinders the ability of others to place competing goods and distorts competition
on the market concerned.169 US courts also conduct a “highly fact-specific” enquiry in
aesthetic functionality cases, acknowledging that “aesthetic function and branding
success can sometimes be difficult to distinguish.”170 Secondly, functionality is not
the opposite of source indication. US scholars argue that “aesthetic functionality
cases frequently involve features that have both source-related and non-sourcerelated significance” and this “dual significance” makes it difficult to know whether
“the feature is either functional, on the one hand, or has source significance, on the
other.”171 It is nonetheless possible for product features to have secondary meaning
and still be “competitively necessary in at least some context.”172 Thirdly, US courts
have long acknowledged that beauty is a form of function.173 Some scholars thus
question “the near uniform sense that aesthetic features generally are not
competitively necessary,”174 and even the most ardent critics of functionality
acknowledge that “product market competition can be impaired by protecting
aesthetic trade dress just as much as it can by protecting utilitarian trade dress.”175
Fourthly, recent US scholarship backs up the AG’s proposal for adjusting the
analytical framework for aesthetically functional features because of “the subjectivity

Id. at 18.
Lavinia Brancusi, Trade Marks’ Functionality in EU Law: Expected New Trends After the
Louboutin Case, 2 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 98, 104-105 (2019).
168 Charles Gielen, Substantial Value Rule: How It Came into Being And Why It Should Be
Abolished, 3 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 164, 167 (2014).
169 Hauck GmbH & Co. KG, 2014 E.C.R. I-2233 (Opinion of AG Szpunar, at ¶ 93) (which the
CJEU endorsed at ¶ 35).
170 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America Holding Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 222
(2nd Cir. 2012) (This requires balancing the claimant’s right to enjoy the benefits of source
significance against the public’s right to competitive markets.).
171 Mark McKenna, (Dis) Functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823, 855 (2011).
172 Id.
173 W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 343 (7th Cir. 1985). See also, Jay Franco &
Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855, 860 (7th Cir, 2010) (“Fashion is a form of function.”) (Easterbrook,
J.); Eco Manufacturing LLC v. Honeywell Int’l. Inc., 357 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Aesthetic
appeal can be functional; often we value products for their looks.”).
174 Mark McKenna, (Dis)Functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823, 846 (2011) (critiquing McCarthy’s
views on aesthetic functionality, which are cited with approval by Charles Gielen, supra note 154, at
169)
175 Robert Bone, Trade Mark Functionality Re-Examined, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 56 (2015). See
also, William McGeverman & Mark McKenna, Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
253, 281 (2013).
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and heterogeneity of aesthetic preference” among consumers.176 However, this
scholarship offers a more nuanced view of consumer tastes than that articulated by
Kur, Brancusi and AG Szpunar. Justin Hughes argues that US “aesthetic”
functionality cases are actually about cognitive or psychological responses in
consumers, not aesthetics per se.177 Such cognitive and psychological consumer
responses are based “either on evolution or deeply rooted acculturation that may or
may not be ‘aesthetic.’”178 Courts should thus ask whether the aesthetic appeal of the
claimed feature arises from pre-existing consumer biases or whether the preference
arises from activities of the owner. Positive consumer responses to certain colours
are usually the result of evolution or acculturation before (and regardless of) any
branding efforts by the owner.179 The focus on pre-existing aesthetic propensities
enables Hughes to claim that courts should only find aesthetic functionality “when
the product feature at issue triggers a positive cognitive, psychological, or aesthetic
response among a substantial composite of the relevant consumers and that response
predates the . . . owner’s activities.”180 One (hypothetical) example of a feature that
was once mechanically functional but became purely stylistic is the Lincoln Mark car
boot hump.181 Its aesthetic cue for luxury among American drivers is the creation of
Ford Company’s marketing efforts; this consumer response should not be the basis
for aesthetic functionality.
Nonetheless, arguments about the potential for
“technological change” to render ornamental what was once functional are not new.182
Features triggering pre-existing consumer disposition should remain free for all
despite the dynamic nature of fashion trends. Indeed, in the fashion industry,
“products and consumer taste are cyclical in nature.”183 Some critique the Hauck
substantial value factors for being temporary in nature (i.e. pricing and marketing
campaigns) even though the ban is permanent.184 What is strikingly missing in these
critiques is the need for a more contextualized market-orientated examination that
considers both industry practices and competitive necessity. That is, a crucial part of
aesthetic functionality is played by evidence of whether competition in the specific
industry is largely driven by visual appeal and the significant impact that protection
176 Robert Bone, Trade Mark Functionality Re-examined, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 56 (2015) (also
identifying the close connection between aesthetic value and source identification as a tricky aspect
of aesthetic functionality); See also, Justin Hughes, Non-Traditional Trade Marks and the Dilemma
of Aesthetic Functionality, supra note 127, at 115; Justin Hughes, Cognitive and Aesthetic
Functionality in Trade Mark Law, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1227, 1248 (2015) (“’Heterogeneity’ is
certainly a characteristic –a fundamental characteristic of aesthetic preferences overall . . . .”).
177 Justin Hughes, Cognitive and Aesthetic Functionality in Trade Mark Law, 36 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1227, 1230 (2015).
178 Id. at 1248.
179 Id. at 1253 (reviewing US case-law).
180 Id. at 1230.
181 Id. at 1274-1279 (offering further examples from actual US cases).
182 Eco Manufacturing LLC v. Honeywell Int’l. Inc., 357 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 2004) (accepting
that claimant’s round dial for thermostats, which was once patented, might lose its utilitarian
significance with the passage of time). It can also go the opposite way: what was intended to be
ornamental might turn out to be utilitarian; See Leapers Inc. v. SMTS, LLC, 879 F.3d 731, 737
(6th Cir. 2018) (offering the example of a new windshield).
183 Uma Suthersanen, Function, Art and Fashion: Do We Need the EU Design Law?, in
CONSTRUCTING EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 355, 378 (Christopher Geiger ed., 2013).
184 ANNETTE KUR & MARTIN SEFTLEBEN, EUROPEAN TRADE MARK LAW, A COMMENTARY 169
(2017).
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may have upon the availability of acceptable alternatives.185 That evidence must
come from claimants, not tribunals. More importantly, it is highly questionable that
the CJEU should adopt a permissible approach to the rationale of keeping functional
signs free for all, especially when word marks, logos and labels remain available to
distinguish products such as G-Star jeans, Lego toy-bricks, Louboutin shoes, and
Tripp-Trapp chairs.
V. CONCLUSION
The EU functionality doctrine remains highly controversial. It has gone from
being a rarely used and obscure provision to being the primary tool for preventing
socially unacceptable monopolies and preserving market freedom. Despite calls for
reducing its scope, legislative reforms have endowed functionality with a far greater
role in enhancing competition. The EU legislature however failed to articulate the
policies and normative content that should guide any functionality analysis. The
CJEU has been active in providing guidance by second-guessing the legislative intent
in the light of the Common Market. Its case-law around functionality is gradually
becoming more settled but it has yet to offer a more principled approach to some of
the statutory provisions such as utilitarian and aesthetic functionality. In its
pronouncements, however, the Court makes it clear that functionality is a truly
European doctrine, and is not merely anti-accumulation measure.

185 Leapers Inc. v. SMTS, LLC, 879 F.3d 731, 739-740 (adopting this market-orientated
approach.)

